Each nation can do well, as in the life of individuals, only if things go equally well in all of her neighboring nations; the life of sciences is similar to that of states whose interest demands that everything be in order within individual states as properly as their relations be in good order among themselves. Understanding this correctly, the most important carriers of mathematical thoughts have always shown great interest in the law and order in neighboring sciences and, above all for the benefit of mathematics, have cultivated the relations to the neighboring sciences, in particular to physics and epistemology. The essence of these relations and the ground of their fertility will be made most distinct, I believe, if I sketch to you that general method of inquiry which appears to grow more and more significant in modern mathematics; the axiomatic method, I mean.
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If we examine a specific theory more closely, we then discern on all occasions that at the bottom of the construction of a framework of concepts are certain few prominent propositions of the field of knowledge, which alone are then sufficient for building up the entire framework upon them in accordance with logical principles.
The proposition of the linearity of the planar equation is thus sufficient in geometry, and that of orthogonal transformation of point-coordinates is complete to produce the entirety of extensive knowledge in the geometry of Euclidean space solely by the means of analysis. Similarly, the laws and rules of computation for integers are sufficient for setting up the theory of numbers. The same role is taken over by the parallelogram law of forces in statics, something like Lagrangian differential equations of motion in mechanics, and Maxwell's equations accepting the condition of rigidity and change of electrons in electrodynamics. Thermodynamics is completely built upon the concept of energy function and the definition of temperature and pressure as derivatives from their variables, entropy, and volume. In the midpoint of elementary radiation theory there stands KirchhofE's law on the relations between emission and absorption; there is the Gaussian law of error in the calculus of probability, the theorem of entropy as negative logarithm of probability of events in the gas theory, the representation of arc elements by quadratic differential form in the theory of surfaces, the existence theorem of roots in the theory of equations, the reality and frequency theorem of zero-points of Riemann zeta function, the fundamental theorem in the theory of primes.
Viewed from a primary standpoint, these theorems may be looked upon as the axioms of individual fields of knowledge; the advancing development of individual fields of knowledge rests then on the more extensive logical enlargement of the completed framework of concepts. This standpoint predominates principally in pure mathematics, and we are indebted for the corresponding modes of operation to the mighty development of geometry, arithmetic, function theory, and analysis in entirety.
In the preceding cases the problem of founding individual fields of knowledge had consequently obtained a solution; this solution, however, was only a tentative one. As a matter of fact, it became necessary in individual fields of knowledge to found anew the aforementioned founding propositions themselves, once considered axioms and placed at the foundation. So came into being the "proofs" for the linearity of the planar equation and the orthogonality of the transformation expressing a motion, and also for the laws of arithmetic computations, for the parallelogram of forces, for the Lagrangian equations of motion and Kirchhoff's law of emission and absorption, for the principle of entropy and the existence theorem of the roots of an equation.
But the critical examination of these "proofs" makes it discernible that they are not proofs in themselves; rather, they are in the main only capable of leading back to certain more deeply lying propositions which in turn are now to be looked upon as new axioms in place of those propositions to be proved. So originated the proper, currently so-called axioms of geometry, of arithmetic, of statics, of mechanics, of radiation theory or of thermodynamics. These axioms form a more deeply lying layer of axioms opposite to another layer of axioms as they have been characterized by the aforementioned propositions of the first foundation in individual fields of knowledge. The procedure of the axiomatic method, as articulated here, comes thus up to a deeper-laying of foundations of individual fields of knowledge, just as such a one is indeed necessary for each building according as it will be enlarged, built higher, and yet vouched for its safety.
If the theory of a field of knowledge, that is, the framework of concepts that represents the theory, is to serve its purpose, namely the orientation and order, it must then satisfy chiefly two fixed demands: it must offer, first, a general view of the dependence or independence of the propositions of the theory and, second, a guarantee of consistency of all propositions of the theory. In particular, the axioms of each theory have to be proved in accordance with these two viewpoints.
Let us work first at the dependence or independence of axioms. 4 Philosophia Mathematica, Vol VII, [1] [2] The parallel axiom in geometry offered the classic example for the examination of independence of an axiom. Euclid answered in the negative to the question as to whether the proposition of parallels is already conditioned by other axioms, because he placed it under the axioms. Euclid's method of investigation became typical of the axiomatic investigation and, since Euclid, geometry has at once been the model example for an axiomatic science in general.
Classic mechanics offers another example for an investigation of independence of axioms. The -Lagrangian equation of motion, as has already been observed, could act as axioms of mechanics -upon these does mechanics no doubt found itself completely in their general formulation for arbitrary forces and arbitrary secondary conditions. A closer examination reveals, however, that arbitrary forces as well as arbitrary secondary conditions are unnecessary to presuppose for the construction of mechanics, and that, consequently, the system of presuppositions can be reduced. This recognition leads on the one hand to the axiomatic system of Boltzmann who presupposes only forces, indeed central forces in particular, and on the other hand to the axiomatic system of Hertz who rejects forces and wants no more than the secondary conditions, indeed fixed connections in particular. These two axiomatic systems form thus a deeper layer in the advancing axiomatization of mechanics.
It is similarly the case if we would assume as an axiom something like the reality theorem of zero points of Riemann zeta function in the theory of primes. The proof of this reality theorem would become necessary for the progress towards the deeper layer of pure arithmetic axioms, and it would best guarantee the safety of important conclusions; we have already set up the axioms through its postulation for the theory of primes.
' Special interest for the axiomatic treatment is offered by the question of dependence of the propositions of a field of knowledge on the axiom of continuity.
It is shown in the theory of real numbers that the axiom of measurement, the so-called Archimedian axiom, is independent of all other axioms of arithmetic. As is well-known, this knowledge is of essential significance to geometry, but it seems to me that it has principal interest in physics as well; for it leads us to the following outcome. That is, the fact that we can come up with the dimensions and ranges of celestial bodies by putting together terrestial ranges, namely measuring celestial lengths by terrestial measure, as well as the fact that the distances inside atoms can be expressed in terms of metric measure, is by no means a merely logical consequence of propositions on the triangular congruence and the geometric configuration, but rather an investigative result of experience. The validity of the Archimedian axiom in the nature, in the sense indicated as above, needs experimental confirmation just as much as does the proposition of the angular sum in triangle in the ordinary sense.
In general, I should like to formulate the axiom of continuity in physics as follows: "If a certain arbitrary degree of exactitude is prescribed for the validity of a physical assertion, a small range shall then be specified, within which the presuppositions prepared for the assertion may freely vary such that the deviation from the assertion does not overstep the prescribed degree of exactitude." This axiom in the main brings only that into expression which directly lies in the essense of experiments; it has always been assumed by physicists who, however, have never specifically formulated it.
If one derives, after Planck for instance, the second Heat Theorem from the axiom of the impossibility of the Perpetuum mobile zweiter Art (perpetual motion machine of the second kind), this axiom of continuity is then necessarily employed for it.
Hamel has shown in a very interesting manner, referring to the well-ordering principle of the continuum, that the axiom of continuity is necessary for the proof of the parallel law of forces in the foundation of statics -at least for a certain handy choice of other axioms.
The axioms of classic mechanics can experience a process of deeper founding if one considers the continuous motion, by virtue of the axiom of continuity, in short successive, rectlinearly uniform piecewise broken motions caused by impulse, and then employs Bertrand's maximal principle as a primary mechanical axiom; according to the latter, the actually occur-ring motion after each push is what makes the kinetic energy of the system a maximum opposite to all motions compatible with the principle of the conservation of energy.
Into the newest modes of founding physics, especially of electrodynamics, which in entirety is nothing but the theory of continuum itself and accordingly takes up the challenge of continuity to the widest extent, I would not enter here, since this investigation has not yet been sufficiently completed.
We will now examine the second of the aforementioned viewpoints, namely the question of the consistency of axioms; this is manifestly of greater importance, since the presence of a contradiction in a theory manifestly imperils the stability of the entire theory.
The understanding of the internal consistency is linked to difficulty even in the long accepted and flourishing theories; I am thinking of "Uvikehr-und Wiederkehreinwand" (arguments against Boltzmann's "H-Theorem" by Loschmidt and Zermelo, .respectively) in the kinetic gas theory.
It often happens that the internal consistency of a theory is considered self-explanatory while, in truth, deep mathematical developments are necessary for proofs. For example, let us reflect upon a problem from the elementary theory of heat conduction, namely the temperature distribution inside a homogeneous body whose surface is kept well within a definite temperature varying from spot to spot; then, the demand for the existence of temperature equilibrium contains in' fact no internal contradiction of the theory. To understand this, however, it is necessary to prove that the well-known boundary value problem of potential theory is always solvable, because this boundary value problem alone shows that a temperature distribution satisfying the equation of heat conduction is possible at all.
It is all the more insufficient in physics, however, if the propositions of a theory are in harmony with themselves; rather, they still have to meet the demand that they never contradict the propositions of a neighboring field of knowledge as well.
Thus, as I showed a short while ago, the axioms of elementary radiation theory affords, in addition to the foundation of Kirchhoff's law on emission and absorption, still another special law on reflection and refraction of single light rays, namely the law: If two rays of natural light and of equal energy fall at a time from a side upon the area of separation of two media in such directions that one ray after penetration and the other after reflection take the same direction, the ray created by the union is then again of natural light and of equal energy. This law, as it shows in fact, is in no way contradicting optics, but it can be derived as conclusion from the electromagnetic theory of light.
The results of the kinetic gas theory are well-known to be in the best harmony with thermodynamics. s Similarly, electromagnetic inertia and Einstein's gravitation are compatible with their corresponding concepts in classic mechanics as long as the latter are considered borderline cases of the more general concepts.
On the other hand, the modern theory oj quanta and the advancing knowledge of the inner structure of atoms have led to the laws which flatly contradict the electrodynamics that, up to now, has substantially been built upon Maxwell's equations; as everyone concedes, therefore, the contemporary electrodynamics necessarily demands a new foundation and substantial modification.
As one notes from the preceding lines, the elimination of recurring contradictions in physical theories must always take place through altered selection of axioms, and the difficulty lies in the proper choice by which all observed physical laws are logically deducible.
The situation changes, however, if contradictions appear in purely theoretical fields of knowledge. Set theory offers the classic example for such an occurrence, in particular the paradox of the set of all sets that goes as far back as to Cantor himself. This paradox is so serious that such very distinguished mathematicians as Kronecker and Poincare for instance felt induced to deny set theory in entirety -one of the most fruitful and powerful branches of mathematics in general -any justification of existence.
The axiomatic method brought remedy also under those precarious circumstances. As he set up suitable axioms to restrict, on the one hand, the arbitrariness in the definitions of sets themselves and, on the other, the admissibility of statements on their elements in a specific way, Zermelo succeeded to develop set theory in such a manner that the paradoxes under discussion fall away and, for all restrictions, the purport and applicability of set theory remains the same.
In all the preceding cases the question was the contradictions which had been brought out in the process of developing a theory, and their elimination pressed the need for modifications of axiomatic systems. It is not enough to avoid contradictions, however, if the reputation, damaged by them, of mathematics as the model of the most rigorous science should be restored. The principal demand of axiomatics must go further ahead, namely so far as to understand that contradictions are always altogether impossible in a field of knowledge founded on the erected system of axioms.
Corresponding to this demand in the Grundlagen der Geometry, (Foundations of Geometry) I proved the consistency of the erected axioms, in which I showed that each contradiction in the deduction from the geometric axioms must necessarily be discernible in the arithmetic of the real number system as well.
No doubt for the fields of physical knowledge, too, it is always sufficient to reduce the question of inner consistency to the consistency of arithmetic axioms. So I showed the consistency of the axioms of elementary radiation theory as I constructed the axiomatic system for the theory with analytically independent parts -where the consistency of analysis was presumed.
Circumstances permitting, one may and must similarly proceed in the construction of a mathematical theory. If we regard as an axiom, for example, the theorem of the existence of roots in the development of Galois theory of equations or the theorem of the reality oj zero points of Riemann zeta function in the theory of primes, the consistency proof of the axiomatic system then always amounts just to the proof of the theorem of the existence of roots and Riemann's theorem on the zeta function with the aid of analysis, respectively -and the completion of the theory is therewith secured for the first time.
Also the question of the consistency of the axiomatic system for real numbers is reduced, through the use of set theoretic concepts, to the same question for integers. This is the merit of the theories, by Weierstrass and Dedekind, of irrational numbers.
Only in two cases, namely if it is a question of the axioms of integers themselves, and if it is a question of the foundation of set theory, this mode of reduction to another specific field of knowledge is manifestly impracticable, since beyond logic there is no more discipline to which an appeal could be lodged.
Since the consistency proof is a task that cannot be dismissed, however, it seems necessary to axiomatize logic itself and then to establish that number theory as well as set theory is only a part of logic.
This road, prepared for a long time -not in the least through the profound investigations by Frege -has finally been pursued by the ingenious mathematician and logician, Russell, with greatest success. In the completion of this extensive enterprise by Russell for the axiomatization of logic one can behold the crowning of the work of axiomatization in general.
Meanwhile, this completion still demands new and various works. By closer examination we presently discern that the consistency question of integers and sets is not isolated for itself; rather, it belongs to a great region of the most difficult epistemological questions of specific mathematical coloration. To characterize briefly this region of questions, I mention by name the problem of principal solvability of every mathematical question, the problem of supplementary controllability of the results of a mathematical investigation, the question of a criterion for the simplicity of mathematical proofs, the question of relations between contentualness (InhaltlichkeU) and formalism in mathematics and logic, and finally the problem of decidability of a mathematical question by a finite number of operations.
Until all questions of this type in their correlation are understood and explained, then, we cannot be satisfied with the axiomatization of logic.
The last among the preceding questions, namely the question of decidability by a finite number of operations, is the most well-known and also the most frequently discussed, because it deeply touches the essence of mathematical thinking.
I should like to stir up more interest in it as I now refer to a few particular mathematical problems in which it plays a role.
In the theory of algebraic invariants, the fundamental theorem is known to hold that there always exists a finite number in (rational) integers of invariants, by which all the rest of such invariants can be integrally represented. The first general proof, by myself, of this theorem satisfies our demands, as I believe, and indeed abundantly with respect to simplicity and lucidity. It is impossible, however, to modify this proof so that we obtain in the process a specifiable limit for the number of finitely many invariants of the full system, or even to succeed in arranging it in concrete. Rather, entirely different kinds of investigation and new principles are necessarily needed for discerning that the arrangement of the full invariant system demands only those operations, the number of which is finite and lies under a limit specifiable by computation.
The same situation is observed in an example from the theory of surfaces. In the geometry of fourth-order surfaces there is a fundamental question as to how many of mutually separated convex surfaces (i.e. sheets) such a surface at most consists of.
The first to be answered for the question is the evidence that the number of such sheets must be finite; this can easily appear on the road of function theory, namely as follows: Assume the presence of infinitely many sheets and then choose a point at a time inside a part of space bounded by a sheet. A concentration spot of these infinitely many chosen points would then be a point of such singularity as to be barred from an algebraic surface.
This road of.function theory leads by no means to an upper limit for the number of sheets; for this, one should rather investigate the number of intersections, which will then •finally show that the number of sheets can never be more than 12.
The second method, completely different from the first, in turn is not applicable to it and also not modifiable so that it will enable us to decide whether there exists a fourth-order surface with 12 sheets.
Since a fourth-order quaternary form has 35 homegeneous coefficients, we can then illustrate a specific fourth-order surface through a point in a 34-dimensional space. The discriminant of the fourth-order quaternary form is of degree 108 in its own coefficients; if equated to zero, it then represents a J08th-order surface in the 34-dimensional space. Since the coefficients of the discriminant itself are specific integers, the topological character of the discriminant surface is exactly determinable according to the rules which are routine in the 2-and 3-dimensional spaces such that we can be exactly informed of the nature and meaning of individual sections in which the discriminant surface divides the 34-dimensional space. Now all the fourth-order surfaces represented by the points of these sections certainly possess the equal number of sheets, and it is therefore possible to determine, by finite if only very troublesome and wearisome steps of computation, whether or not there exists a fourth-order surface with less than or equal to 12 sheets.
The geometric consideration as above is thus a third way to treat our question concerning the maximal number of sheets of a fourth-order surface. It proves the decidability of this question by a finite number of operations. An important demand of our problem is thereby met in principle. Similarly reduced to a problem of the same rank is something like the task of establishing the decimal expression of «• up to the 10 "
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-th place -a task, the solvability of which is evident, but the solution of which remains unknown.
It needs perhaps the penetrating and difficult investigation in algebraic geometry, carried out by Rohn, to understand that Jl sheets are impossible for a fourth-order surface; on the other hand, 10 sheets actually occur. This fourth method alone brings therewith the complete solution of the problem.
These specific executions show how various methods of proof are applicable to the same problem; they also suggest to us the necessity to study the essence of mathematical proof 12 Philosophia Mathematica, Vol. VII, [1] [2] itself if such questions as those of decidability by finitely many operations should be answered at all.
All such questions concerning principles as those I have so far characterized -of which only the last mentioned was concerned with the decidability by finitely many operationsseem to me to constitute an important and newly accessible field of research; to capture this field we must -this^ is my conviction -make the concept of specific mathematical proof itself the object of an investigation, just as the astronomer must take his position into account, the physicist must take care of the theory of his apparatus, and the philosopher criticizes the reason itself.
The implementation of this program is still an unsolved problem at present, of course.
In conclusion, I should like to summarize my general understanding of the axiomatic method in a few lines.
I believe: Everything that can be object of scientific thinking in general, as soon as it is ripe for formation of a theory, runs into the axiomatic method and thereby indirectly to mathematics. Forging ahead towards the ever deeper layers of axioms in the above sense we attain ever deepening insights into the essence of scientific thinking itself, and we become ever more clearly conscious of the unity of our knowledge. In the evidence of the axiomatic method, it seems, mathematics is summoned to play a leading role in science in general.
